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Abstract The criminal justice system combines at least three distinct institutions, police,
prosecutors, and courts, in order to enforce key regulations. Focusing on criminal environ-
mental law contained in the German Penal Code, this paper empirically studies the determi-
nants of enforcement decisions at the levels of the police, prosecutors, and judges using a
production function approach. We focus particularly on the role of economic and political
factors and their comparison across institutions. The results of the panel data analysis show
evidence for the presence of economic factors determining behavior at all levels. Political
factors impact especially on police and court behavior.
Keywords Criminal enforcement · Political economy · Environmental law · GMM
JEL Classification K42 · K32 · D78 · C23
1 Introduction
The criminal justice system ensures compliance with those regulations that the political
system deems important enough to apply the most severe forms of sanctions available to so-
ciety. Its functioning is therefore an essential determinant of policy outcomes (Polinsky and
Shavell 2006) and—as a result—has been attracting the attention of public choice scholars
at least since Becker and Stigler (1974). Since then, researchers have noted that one of the
distinguishing features of the criminal justice system is that it consists of several separate
regulatory institutions that are arranged sequentially, rather than a single monolithic system.
At the base, there is a police force that monitors and investigates, followed by a prosecution
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service that decides on the basis of police reports and own investigations on the merits of an
offence, and, finally, courts that decide on cases brought before their judges by prosecutors.
The resulting literature has analyzed these institutions one-by-one, progressively uncovering
the political and economic factors that shape the behavior of the police (Mast et al. 2000;
Levitt 1997; Benson et al. 1995), prosecutors (Rasmusen et al. 2009; Boylan 2005;
Dyke 2007; Baker and Mezzetti 2001; Kobayashi and Lott 1996), and judges and courts
(Cohen 1992; Hanssen 2000, 2004a, 2004b; Palmer 1982; Kimenyi and Shughart 1993;
Salzberger and Fenn 1999; Ashenfelter et al. 1995; Belova and Gregory 2009).1
The objective of this paper is to use a unique dataset that covers the handling of envi-
ronmental offences in the German criminal justice system in order to examine and compare
the economic and political determinants of decisions of police, prosecutors, and courts in
a unified perspective rather than individually. Being able to compare determinants across
the three different institutions is instructive because it provides empirical evidence on how
institutional differences between police, prosecution service, and courts shape their choices
about the same subject matter. While the three institutions share a uniform legal background
in form of the German Penal Code and a joint overall objective and are procedurally inter-
connected, police, prosecution service, and courts vary in several important ways. From a
public choice perspective, one key dimension is the degree of independence from the po-
litical process that these institutions enjoy in Germany: The police force is—as part of the
executive branch of government—relatively dependent. Courts, on the other hand, are delib-
erately set up to operate at arm’s length from other branches of government. The prosecution
service, finally, combines elements of both dependence and independence: While subject to
directions from the executive branch (ministries of justice), prosecutors enjoy considerable
autonomy that is safeguarded by law and largely invariant vis-a-vis government. Therefore,
agents at different stages of the sequential enforcement process face different incentives
and different resource constraints. Comparing these institutions, observed enforcement out-
comes at each level should reflect the different degrees of independence. The empirical
question is whether this conjecture is borne out by reality. This leads to three sub-questions.
The first is what determines enforcement decisions by the police force, prosecutors, and
judges within the criminal justice system. The second is whether and if yes, to what de-
gree, decision-makers are responsive to the preferences of voters and politicians. The third
is how the influence differs between agents at different stages. Is the conjecture correct that
those institutions of enforcement that enjoy greater independence by design are indeed less
responsive to the political factors that drive the legislature and executive?
The core of the present paper consists of an empirical approach to answering these
questions in a particular context, the enforcement of environmental criminal law.2 This
highly specific area of criminal law lends itself to an empirical investigation of this
type for two reasons. One is that it is an area of criminal law that—because of the
complexity of its nature—requires non-trivial amounts of resources to be spent at every
level in order to push cases through the enforcement process (Lutterer and Hoch 1997;
Cohen 1999). This offers an opportunity to recover from empirical data the economic deter-
minants of enforcement decisions at the level of the police force, prosecution services, and
courts because pursuing environmental crimes imposes non-negligible opportunity costs.
The other reason is that the environment is a type of public good for which the preferences
of the public and politicians are reasonably specific and partially observable: Elections and
1See Shugart and Tollison (1998) for an additional overview.
2See Rousseau (2009) for an overview of related work.
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party ideology are just two examples of established proxies for environmental preferences
and have been successfully exploited in the past for similar purposes as those of the present
paper. Taken together, the workings of the criminal justice system in this particular area
should be especially suited for uncovering the resource and political economy factors that
shape the system. Methodologically, we take to its logical conclusion the premise common
in the public choice literature that the behavior of public agents is the solution to a con-
straint maximization problem. Conceptualizing their decisions as ‘producing enforcement’,
the paper demonstrates the usefulness of using methods of dynamic production function
estimation (Blundell and Bond 2000) for understanding the economic and political determi-
nants of regulatory enforcement.
Our key results are threefold. The first is that decision-makers at all stages of the enforce-
ment process weigh the opportunity costs of their actions. This implies that—very much in
line with the economic theory of enforcement and a functionalist view of government—
institutions deliberately direct resources away from the enforcement of environmental law
as its opportunity cost increases. This responsiveness with respect to costs is evident at all
levels, including criminal courts, which enjoy the greatest degree of political independence.
It also lends credibility to using a production function approach as a methodological starting
point. The second result is that political economy factors influence enforcement at two out
of the three stages of the process. This demonstrates that even in the ostensibly most in-
dependent parts of the criminal justice system, there is evidence of political reach-through.
The third result is that the relative weight of political economy factors is not fully in line
with the declared degree of independence: Judges’ decisions seem to be as responsive to
political economy variables as the police force, while results for prosecutor’s decisions are
ambiguous.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, we summarize the main features
of environmental crime and its prosecution in Germany, emphasizing the three institutions of
police, prosecution service, and courts involved in criminal enforcement. We then develop
a set of testable hypotheses on the determinants of enforcement decisions at each of the
institutions in Sect. 3. Section 4 explains the data sources, followed by a presentation of
the empirical strategy and key results in Sect. 5. Section 6 discusses the results and Sect. 7
concludes.
2 Environmental crime and its prosecution in Germany
The German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) was extended in 1980 to include environmental
offences. The intention behind this move was (i) to raise the level of general deterrence
on account of harsher sanctions being available through the criminal justice system, (ii) to
harness the additional police, prosecutorial, and judicial resources available in the criminal
justice system, and (iii) to improve general awareness of the need for greater environmental
protection (Hoch 1994; Schall 2006). Stiffer sanctions were introduced into the German
Penal Code in 1994, following the inclusion of environmental protection in the German
Constitution as a distinct constitutional objective.
Harnessing the enforcement capabilities of the Penal Code implies the involvement of
three distinct institutions in the handling of cases that enter into the criminal enforcement
system: These are—in sequence—the police force, the public prosecution service, and the
courts. The police forces in the German states, situated at the start of the enforcement se-
quence, are controlled directly by the executive, being part of the Ministry of the Interior.
Operating budgets and personnel resources are largely determined externally. The police
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force’s main activity is to respond to the detection of an environmental criminal act by ded-
icating resources to identifying the probable offender(s). The share of environmental crimes
in Germany for which the identity of the probable offender(s) is established, also referred to
as the ‘clearance rate’ of reported environmental crime, is an average of 60%. The contribu-
tion of the police force within the enforcement system is therefore primarily the production
of so-called ‘cleared’ cases by identifying probable offenders that are fed into the following
prosecutorial stage of enforcement. However, the police force also has to dedicate resources
to assist the prosecution service in those cases in which the prosecution service decides to
bring a case to trial, raising the cost of investigating new crimes.
At the subsequent stage, the enforcement system involves the public prosecution service.
There, prosecutors examine cases with identified suspects and decide on whether to accuse
a suspect or not. The prosecution services in the German Lander are part of the respective
Ministries of Justice. Prosecutors are appointed, not elected. In common with judges, pros-
ecutors enjoy considerable discretionary power, but are dependent to a significantly greater
extent on an executive unit (the Ministry) that determines budget and resources. Like judges,
prosecutors operate under the so-called legality principle that requires a prosecution of each
and every case that is sufficiently likely to involve a crime. On the other hand, a decision
in favor of bringing a case to trial implies that resources need to be dedicated to preparing
a case at a level of detail for guilt to be ascertained at the standard required for a criminal
conviction. Rational prosecutors will incur the opportunity cost of these resources only if
the resultant expected benefits dominate those of other prosecutions foregone. Owing to the
technical nature of the subject matter, environmental cases are on average of a relatively
high complexity and thus resource-intensive. On average, 25% of identified offenders are
passed on by prosecutors to be tried in court, with the remainder of cases either dismissed
for lack of evidence or insufficient severity of the offence or the offender punished using
lighter administrative fines that establish no criminal record.
Courts are the third and final distinct institution involved in the criminal enforcement
system. The courts consist of judges that enjoy—within the law—full discretionary power
on how to sanction. Judges hear cases brought to trial by public prosecutors and decide
on whether to convict a defendant, and if yes, what tariff to set as a sanction. Of those
defendants ending up in court, more than three quarters (76%) are sentenced, of which 6.4%
are ordered to pay heavy fines and 3.5% are sentenced to prison. The rest faces a standard
pecuniary tariff.
At each one of the three stages of the enforcement process, institutions involved face
opportunity costs in terms of resources and trade-offs in terms of priorities when deciding
to what extent to enforce environmental crimes. The subsequent focus in this paper is on the
determinants of these enforcement decisions, among them political economy factors that
capture policy-specific interests among the population and the ideological orientation of the
executive. Given the specific nature of environmental criminal law, observed environmental
preferences of the population will be considered as candidate explanatory variables. Like-
wise, political parties in Germany have a clear profile as to the priority they place on envi-
ronmental matters (Klingemann et al. 2007). The identity of governing parties will therefore
be used to capture these ideological factors that operate either within the executive or are
imposed on the executive by virtue of the competitiveness of the political process.
The empirical strategy in this paper is to exploit the devolved nature of enforcement
under the German Penal Code. While federal law, its implementation, i.e., detection, prose-
cution, and sanctioning by courts, is delegated comprehensively to the level of the 16 States
(Länder) within the Federal Republic. Unlike in the United States, there is no federal shadow
system of federal prosecutors or EPA officers that monitor, assist, remedy, and possibly pre-
empt state-level enforcement. This comprehensive delegation from the federal to the state
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level generates—against a uniform legal background—the natural variation in enforcement
choices at the level of police forces, prosecution services, and courts that this paper exploits.
3 Hypotheses on the determinants of enforcement decisions
In this section we develop the arguments that give rise to four testable hypotheses regarding
the extent to which economic and political factors help explain enforcement decisions of
different institutions involved in the compliance assurance process.
3.1 Police
As the first of three institutions involved in enforcing the German Penal Code against envi-
ronmental offenders, decisions of police forces determine the influx of cases into the system
by passing ‘cleared’ cases, that is cases for which suspects are identified, on to the pros-
ecution office. The ‘production’ of cleared cases is determined by the number of cases on
the one hand and the effort dedicated to linking individuals to an illegal act on the other.
We proceed in two steps, first focusing on the economic determinants of the production of
cleared cases by the police, then discussing the role of political economy factors.
From an economic point of view, the greater production of cleared cases depends on
inputs and opportunity costs of effort dedicated to environmental crimes. The number of
cleared cases of environmental crime is hypothesized to depend positively on the number
of all cases to be investigated. This scale effect hypothesis leads us to predict a positive co-
efficient. Higher opportunity costs of investigation, on the other hand, shift resources away
from investigating environmental crime (Helland 1998). Such opportunity costs are an in-
creased number of overall cases to be investigated, higher production of cleared cases in
other areas, and—finally—a larger number of cases of environmental crime proceeding to
trial and therefore requiring additional police resources dedicated to preparing evidence to
a higher standard of proof. The opposite effect, driven by decreases in opportunity cost, is
known to be generated by changes in enforcement priorities towards environmental crime as
a result of a growing environmental crime rate. Benson et al. (1995) and Coloninger and Sar-
torius (1979) identify increases in crime levels as a key driver of inputs available for crime
detection and reporting, leading us to predict a positive coefficient. In addition to the scale
and opportunity cost effects, there is the question of economies of scope, i.e., the impact
of clearing up overall crime on the marginal cost of clearing environmental crimes: Since
cases of environmental crime are typically linked to other punishable offences (Hoch 1994),
the impact on marginal costs is likely to be negative, implying that a positive economies of
scope effect exists.
Turning to political economy considerations, political factors also impact on the oppor-
tunity costs of effort. Pro-environmental parties in the administration would be predicted to
give higher priority to enforcement resources being shifted towards environmental offences
while pro-industry parties would be predicted to have a lower priority. Likewise, an execu-
tive administration may want to respond to stronger ‘green’ sentiment among the population
by directing the police force to prioritize environmental offences relative to other areas of
crime because the executive shares the population’s green preferences or because respond-
ing to such sentiment defuses environmental issues as rallying points for competing parties.
Given the nature of the police as part of the executive branch, stronger ‘green’ preferences in
the population would therefore be predicted to be associated with a higher volume of cleared
cases produced by the police.
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The predictions on how the volume of cleared cases responds to exogenous variables are
summarized in the following hypothesis.
Conjecture 1 For reasons of economic constraints, the output of cleared cases of environ-
mental crime by police will (a) increase in the amount of cases to be investigated, (b) in-
crease in the growth rate of environmental crime, and (c) decrease in the number of envi-
ronmental crime cases tried and in the number of general crime cases to be investigated.
The effects of (d) the total volume of cleared cases is ambiguous. For reasons of politi-
cal economy, the effect of (e) variables capturing ‘green’ preferences and the effect of a
pro-environmental party in government is predicted to be positive, that of (f) a pro-industry
party in government to be negative.
3.2 Prosecutors
There is a small, but rich literature on prosecutor behavior, starting with Forst and Brosi
(1977). Most of these studies focus on the case-specific determinants of prosecutorial activ-
ity and productivity within the model of a self-interested prosecutor (Myers and Hagan 1979;
Albonetti 1986; Boylan 2005). The empirical results bear out the concept of the prosecutor
as a rational decision-maker, balancing expected benefits in the form of successful convic-
tions against opportunity costs of time and resources.
In terms of economic determinants, prosecutors are predicted to respond to more pros-
ecution opportunities in environmental crimes, i.e., cleared cases forwarded by the police,
with raising the volume of suspects accused. This is the scale effect of prosecution. As at
the level of the police, the scale effect could conceivably be complemented by a scope effect
because more environmental crimes are likely to be uncovered as a result of prosecuting
other forms of crime. An increase in the number of identified suspects across all areas of
crime, on the other hand, will lead to fewer environmental offenders being brought to trial
because the opportunity cost of prosecuting environmental offences increases. Since prose-
cutors cannot be expected to care about deterrence to the same extent as politicians (Miceli
1996), an increase in the growth rate of environmental crime would be predicted to have a
smaller effect on the decision on whether to bring case to trial at the margin.
Political economy considerations have only recently been studied in the context of pros-
ecutor behavior. An approach close to ours in spirit is by Rasmusen et al. (2009). Like
these authors, we include political economy factors as explanatory variables in the empir-
ical model, predicting that the dependence of prosecutors on the Ministry in terms of re-
sources will make their prosecution decisions responsive to political circumstances such as
the identity of the political party in power and the strength of ‘green’ preferences among the
population.
Together, these factors give rise to the following predictions on how the number of cases
brought to trial will respond to different variables.
Conjecture 2 The number of offenders of environmental crime brought to trial by public
prosecutors will (a) increase in the amount of identified suspects, (b) weakly increase in a
growth in environmental crime, and (c) decrease in the number of general suspects to be
investigated on account of an opportunity cost effect. The effects of (d) a higher number of
overall tried suspects is ambiguous. The effect of (e) political economy variables capturing
‘green’ preferences and the effect of a pro-environmental party in government is predicted
to be positive, that of (f) a pro-industry party in government to be negative.
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3.3 Courts
The output of courts in context of environmental enforcement is the production of convicts
out of an input of defendants. There is a strong expectation that the decisions of courts
should—in the words of Landes and Posner (1975)—be independent of “the sorts of polit-
ical factors [. . .] that would influence and in most cases control the decision were it to be
made by a legislative body”. Empirical tests demonstrate that the record does not unequivo-
cally support the prediction of judicial independence. While some studies find that variables
capturing the political environment of current court cases and the judge’s own political back-
ground do not explain court decisions (Ashenfelter et al. 1995), the balance of the literature
tends to emphasize the importance of political economy variables in explaining court be-
havior (Anderson et al. 1989; Salzberger and Fenn 1999). In other words, the interests of
voting public and politicians as well as the ideological convictions of the judges themselves
are—more often than not—found to influence judicial decisions at the margin.
The economic factors that are candidates for explaining the behavior of courts in the
sample center—again—on inputs and opportunity costs. We predict—on account of a scale
effect—that a greater volume of suspects being brought to trial by prosecutors will lead to an
increase in the volume of convicts. However, an increase in overall trials will raise the cost
of time and effort to argue environmental cases to the required standard of proof. As a result,
we predict a negative relationship between the aggregate volume of trials and convictions for
environmental crimes. The impact of a growing rate of environmental crime on convictions
should be weak, as argued before in the case of prosecutors (Miceli 1996), and if not zero,
then positive. The presence of economies of scope between convictions for environmental
and other crimes is an empirical question with little prior evidence as guidance.
In the light of the preceding empirical literature on courts, we predict political economy
factors to have the same effect as at the previous two levels: A ‘greener’ population should—
at the margin—lead to more convictions. So should the presence of a green party in govern-
ment. The presence of a pro-industry party in government, on the other hand, should lead to
a decrease in the conviction rate.
Conjecture 3 summarizes these prediction regarding the decision of judges thus:
Conjecture 3 The number of offenders of environmental crimes ending in a conviction by
a judge will (a) increase in the amount of tried suspects (b) be unaffected by a growth in
environmental crime, and (c) decrease in the number of general crime suspects to be tried
on account of an opportunity cost effect. The effects of (d) a higher number of convictions for
other crimes is ambiguous. The effect of (e) political economy variables capturing ‘green’
preferences and the effect of a pro-environmental party in government is predicted to be
positive, that of (f) a pro-industry party in government to be negative.
The final testable hypothesis concerns the relative strengths of coefficients for variables
capturing political economy factors. Different institutions ostensibly enjoy different degrees
of independence from the legislature, from the police force with the lowest degree to the
courts with the highest degree of autonomy in decision-making. We would therefore expect
that the relative responsiveness of these three institutions vis-à-vis the identity of the govern-
ing party and the preferences of voters should reflect this. The police force would therefore
be predicted to be most responsive, courts the least, and prosecutors somewhere in between.
This idea is captured in Conjecture 4.
Conjecture 4 The absolute value of coefficients for political economy variables capturing
‘green’ preferences and the identity of the party in government should be highest at the level
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of the police, lowest at the level of courts, and between police and courts at the level of the
prosecution service.
With our set of four testable hypotheses complete, we now turn to the data used in the
econometric specifications.
4 Data
Data on crime in Germany are collected at the level of 16 individual states to which en-
forcement is devolved and at various stages in the state-level enforcement process. Since
one state has not released the relevant data, our sample comprises 15 of the 16 states and
the years 1995 (1994 in case of reported cases) to 2005 with a small subset of states having
incomplete reporting,3 leading to an unbalanced panel. Data on reported and cleared cases
of environmental and aggregate crime are available from the official police crime statistics
(PKS) published by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). Further necessary
data of the sanctioning regime applied to crime, such as the number of trials, convictions and
imprisonment, are available from the official prosecution statistics (StVSt) of the Research
Data Centre (FDZ) provided by the Federal Statistical Office and its state level counter-
parts. Data concerning juvenile offenders is included in cleared cases but excluded from the
remaining analysis due to the distinct sanctioning regime applicable to this subgroup. How-
ever, on average 93% of all identified suspects for environmental crimes are adults. Data
on structural variables that characterize individual states, such as population, size, political,
and several socioeconomic variables, are taken from publications of the Federal Statistical
Office.
As there is no annual information on environmental awareness available at the state level
for the period under consideration, we use two different measures that we think are the best
proxies for environmental awareness in Germany. Voting shares and information on the sup-
port for the German Green Party at the state level are taken from the Politbarometer survey
available at the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA, Cologne). Specifically,
voting shares track the share of people surveyed who would vote for the German green party
if there had been elections at the time of the interview. The supporters of the German Green
Party indicate the share of respondents that identify themselves as strong supporters of the
German Greens (1 on a scale of 1–5).
As an indicator of having a pro-industry government in power, we use the presence of
the conservative party (CDU/CSU) in the executive of the state government as a proxy.
The CDU (CSU in Bavaria) is the German party that is consistently most closely aligned
with business and industry interests and least aligned with environmental policy preferences
among the parties in German state parliaments (Klingemann et al. 2007). We also include a
dummy for the presence of the German greens in state governments to validate their impact
on enforcement. Another important factor determining the success of institutions in enforc-
ing environmental criminal law is the endowment of police, prosecution, and courts with
manpower and equipment.
Tables 1 and 2 provide variable definitions and summary statistics for all variables in-
cluded in the core econometric estimation.
3No data are available for the state of Saxony-Anhalt. Saarland’s date cover 1996–2005, Brandenburg
1995–2005 with the exception of 2002, Hamburg’s data 1997–2005. Thuringia’s data cover 1998–2005 and
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2001–2005.
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Table 1 Variable definitions
Variable Definition
cleared env. crimes (cleared) number of cases for which suspects are identified
tried suspects (tried) number of identified suspects that are accused
convicted offenders (convicted) number of accused suspects that are convicted
environmental crime (cases) reported cases of environmental crime
identified suspects (suspects) number of identified environmental offenders
growth rate of environmental crime
(CR)
Growth rate of number of reported cases divided by population
aggr. crime cases (agg.cases) total amount of reported crimes other than environmental
crimes
aggr. cleared cases (agg.cleared) number of overall cleared cases other than environmental
crime cases
aggr. identified suspects
(agg.suspects)
number of identified overall offenders other than environmen-
tal offenders
aggr. tried offenders (agg.tried) total number of accused offender other than environmental of-
fenders
aggr. convicted offenders
(agg.conv)
total number of convicted offenders other than environmental
offenders
dummy conservatives (cons) indicating whether CDU/CSU is in state government
dummy greens (greens) indicating whether green party is in state government
green voters (green.vot) share of people intending to vote for greens
green supporters (green.supp) share of people indicating strong support for greens
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
cleared 1194.495 931.038 24 4258 192
tried 326.546 303.119 6 1497 152
convicted 249.349 236.631 4 1156 152
cases 1987.62 1446.443 58 5848 192
suspects 1205.708 899.89 31 4211 192
CR –0.066 0.215 –0.91 0.572 192
agg.cases 40,3910.964 31,4819.94 60,087 1,529,653 192
agg.cleared 20,7172.292 16,1267.241 30,500 740,584 192
agg.suspects 99,737.354 77,672.327 17,374 344,684 192
agg.tried 77,581.460 65,391.658 10,706 253,981 150
agg.conv 63,067.473 52,403.183 8002 194,942 150
cons 0.547 0.499 0 1 192
greens 0.182 0.387 0 1 192
green.vot 0.102 0.053 0 0.304 192
green.supp 0.044 0.026 0 0.174 192
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5 Econometrics
In this section we analyze the three successive stages of the enforcement process in Ger-
many empirically. One important issue is whether these different punishment variables are
persistent—leading to a dynamic production function (Blundell and Bond 2000)—or not.
As we will show in the next few paragraphs there is evidence for persistency in clearing and
prosecuting environmental crimes but not at the conviction stage.
The two key challenges implicit in a data set of the present type are potential endogene-
ity and small sample size. One particular advantage of the production function approach
pioneered by Blundell and Bond (2000) is that by building on system GMM as proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),4 it is able to control for po-
tential endogeneity issues.5 The small sample size is handled by employing the common
general-to-specific approach: We also included variables indicating the expenditures for po-
lice, prosecution and courts as obvious inputs to the enforcement process. However, none of
these variables turns out to be significant (see Table 6 provided in Appendix A), leaving us
with the specifications presented in Tables 3 to 5.
When reporting results, we include—in addition to the estimated parameters and the
corresponding p-values—results for the two key specifications tests proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). The first one is a test for autocorrelation. The second is the Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan test uses the fact that the system is overidentified
and applies those overidentifying restrictions to test for the validity of the instruments. Both
tests return p-values for rejecting the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation and of the
validity of the overidentifying restrictions. All model specifications are tested using both
measures of environmental awareness (green.vot, green.supp) separately as their correlation
is relatively high (0.67).
5.1 Police
The basis for all later enforcement activities for the major fraction of all reported environ-
mental crimes in Germany6 is the initial work of police.
The equation to be estimated for the production of cleared cases is:
log clearedit = α + β1 log clearedit−1 + β2 log casesit + β3CRit
+ β4 log triedit + β5 log agg.casesit + β6 log agg.clearedit
+ β7consit + β8greensit + β9green.vot/suppit
+ fi + tt + it (1)
where α,β1−9 are the parameters to be estimated, f and t are state and time dummies in-
dexed by i and t , respectively, and  is the error term.
Table 3 displays the coefficient estimates in the upper part and the results of the specifi-
cation tests in the lower part. An inspection of the p-values shows that the results confirm
4All GMM estimations have been carried out with the xtdpd command in Stata 11.
5As a robustness check we estimated the different specification at the three enforcement stages additionally
via bias-correction (Kiviet 1995; Bruno 2005a, 2005b). The results are essentially identical to system GMM
estimates and are available from the authors on request.
6In 2004, 76% of all cases handled by prosecution were forwarded by police, 20% were initiated by the
prosecution itself and 3.2% were reported by environmental agencies.
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Table 3 Estimation results: police
cleared cleared cleared cleared
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cleared, lag 0.676 0.589 0.691 0.677
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cases 0.225 0.292 0.187 0.196
(0.079) (0.054) (0.043) (0.040)
agg.cases –0.416 –0.494 –0.406 –0.403
(0.021) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012)
agg.cleared 0.422 0.500 0.450 0.447
(0.017) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
CR 0.825 0.750 0.813 0.807
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tried 0.0571 0.0758 0.0535 0.0618
(0.230) (0.155) (0.177) (0.177)
cons –0.0468 –0.0449 –0.0834 –0.0812
(0.266) (0.330) (0.062) (0.071)
greens 0.0474 0.0530 0.0156 0.0139
(0.197) (0.189) (0.585) (0.617)
green.vot –0.253 –0.283
(0.321) (0.330)
green.supp –0.549 –0.524
(0.341) (0.348)
N 152 152 152 152
Sargan (0.764) (0.702) (0.159) (0.136)
ar1 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)
ar2 (0.724) (0.728) (0.941) (0.731)
Note: time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. All GMM
specifications have been estimated with robust standard errors (except for the calculation of the Sargan test).
In columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) 3 (2) lags of the dependent variable serve as instruments for the lagged dependent
variable in the differenced equation
the model specification both with respect to autocorrelation and overidentifying restrictions:
There is evidence for ar (1) and no evidence for ar (2) for all specifications in Table 3. The
Sargan test is not able to reject the validity of the exclusion restrictions at the 10% level in
columns 1–4.
Columns 1 and 2 display the benchmark results. Columns 3 and 4 help address simul-
taneity issues between the dependent and explanatory variables: Candidates for simultaneity
at this stage are cases, tried, agg.cases, agg.cleared, and CR. To control for this, the model
treats the identified variables as being endogenous in columns 3 and 4.
Comparing the different specifications does not reveal significant differences for most
variables: The number of cleared cases (cleared) exhibits moderate time dependency as
the lagged variable is highly significant in all specifications. The number of environmen-
tal crimes (cases) has a positive and—with elasticities of around 0.19 to 0.30—significant
influence on the production of cleared cases by police. Overall crime cases (agg.cases)
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Table 4 Estimation results: prosecutors
tried tried tried tried
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tried, lag 0.488 0.462 0.529 0.475
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
suspects 0.487 0.550 0.473 0.537
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
CR, lag 0.392 0.390 0.443 0.435
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
agg.suspects –0.126 –0.419 –0.532 –0.695
(0.718) (0.077) (0.077) (0.041)
agg.tried 0.190 0.428 0.481 0.643
(0.483) (0.021) (0.083) (0.043)
greens –0.0817 –0.0934 –0.0649 –0.0944
(0.140) (0.006) (0.253) (0.030)
cons –0.0564 –0.0856 –0.0804 –0.122
(0.347) (0.047) (0.234) (0.037)
green.vot –0.534 –0.333
(0.770) (0.867)
green.supp 3.399 4.338
(0.004) (0.000)
N 136 136 136 136
Sargan (0.234) (0.301) (0.229) (0.357)
ar1 (0.026) (0.037) (0.023) (0.022)
ar2 (0.810) (0.920) (0.733) (0.960)
Note: time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P -values in parenthesis. All GMM
specifications have been estimated with robust standard errors except for the calculation of the Sargan test.
We again restricted the number of lags to serve as instruments for the lagged dependent variable to 3 (2) in
the differenced equation in columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4)
indicate the presence of opportunity costs and overall cases cleared (agg.cleared) point
towards a general scope effect. Their parameter estimates are highly significant with
elasticities of –0.4 to –0.49 and 0.42 to 0.5, respectively. Estimates for the growth rate
of environmental crime (CR) are highly significant and positive, with elasticities be-
tween 0.75 to 0.83. This provides clear evidence for the police being responsive to
criminal behavior. The amount of suspects brought to court, on the other hand, does
not seem to influence the amount of cleared cases, despite its possible resource im-
pacts.
The remaining explanatory variables capture the political hypothesis. There is no ev-
idence that the share of green voters (green.vot), the share of supporters of the greens
(green.supp) and the greens dummy (greens) influence police behavior in clearing envi-
ronmental crimes. However, the dummy for conservatives in government (cons) substanti-
ates a negative and—for the endogenous specifications—significant connection to cleared
cases.
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Table 5 Estimation results: courts
convicted convicted convicted convicted convicted convicted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
convicted, lag 0.0250 0.0650
(0.580) (0.123)
tried 0.981 0.939 1.038 0.992 0.991 0.975
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CR, lag –0.0865 –0.0582 –0.138 –0.159 –0.149 –0.142
(0.270) (0.452) (0.181) (0.246) (0.097) (0.168)
agg.tried –1.546 –1.396 –1.754 –1.732 –2.183 –2.150
(0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.000) (0.001)
agg.convicted 1.521 1.371 1.582 1.628 2.164 2.140
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001)
cons –0.0177 –0.0194 0.0617 0.0262 –0.0160 –0.0239
(0.660) (0.617) (0.300) (0.605) (0.688) (0.533)
greens –0.0359 –0.0338 0.0139 –0.0111 –0.0339 –0.0264
(0.436) (0.446) (0.789) (0.820) (0.409) (0.582)
green.vot 0.767 1.970 1.373
(0.085) (0.015) (0.004)
green.supp 1.083 0.337 1.420
(0.153) (0.700) (0.060)
N 136 136 150 150 150 150
Sargan (0.001) (0.001) (0.128) (0.356)
ar1 (0.137) (0.147) (0.129) (0.160)
ar2 (0.245) (0.253) (0.237) (0.261)
Note: time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P -values in parenthesis. All GMM
specifications have been estimated with robust standard errors except for the calculation of the Sargan test.
In case of System GMM we restricted the lags of the variables serving as instruments to 3 in the differenced
equation. For the use of System GMM in context of “static panel” (columns 5 and 6), see Roodman (2006)
5.2 Prosecution
It is probably not possible to underrate the role of prosecutors in the context of criminal en-
forcement. Crucially, their decision not to bring a suspect to trial eliminates all opportunities
for a criminal sanction.
With the predictions of Sect. 3.2 in mind, we estimate the following equation:
log triedit = α + β1 log triedit−1 + β2 log suspectsit + β3CRit−1
+ β4 log agg.suspectsit + β5 log agg.triedit + β6consit
+ β7greensit + β8green.vot/suppit + fi + tt + it (2)
where—again—Greek letters represent the parameters to be estimated, f and t indicate state
and time effects, and  the error term. In contrast to the previous section, the growth rate
for environmental crime is included with one lag. The reason for the different specification
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is that police, at the frontline of enforcement, are likely to learn earlier about the crime rate
than prosecutors and judges.7 Table 4 presents the estimation results.
Similarly to cleared cases there is evidence that the amount of tried suspects exhibits
some degree of persistency. Moreover, both the Sargan test and the autocorrelation tests
of order 1 and 2 behave as required. There is therefore no evidence against the estimated
specifications.
Columns 1 and 2 display the results for the exogenous treatment of the explanatory vari-
ables other than the lagged dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 again account for potential
simultaneity issues. The use of the lagged environmental crime growth rate eliminates simul-
taneity issues for this variable at this stage. Increases in prosecutions, however, may hinder
the clearing of additional environmental crime cases. The reasoning for aggregate identi-
fied and tried suspects carries over from the previous stage. We therefore treat suspects,
agg.suspects, and agg.tried as being endogenous in columns 3 and 4.
In addition to the evidence in favor of persistency, the amount of identified suspects in-
fluences the amount of tried offenders with high significance, with elasticities ranging from
0.47 to 0.55. As conjectured in Sect. 3.2, the growth of environmental crime is a significant
and positive driver of the amount of tried suspects (0.39 to 0.44). Estimates for identified
and tried suspects have the expected signs and are significant in three out of four specifica-
tions with elasticities ranging from –0.42 to –0.7 and 0.42 to 0.64, respectively. The findings
for public environmental preferences are surprising: The share of green voters (green.vot)
has a negative, but insignificant effect on the amount of tried environmental offenders. On
the other hand, the parameter estimate for share of strong supporters for the German green
party (green.supp) has a positive and highly significant influence on the amount of tried
offenders. The dummies for presence in government of the German green party and the
conservatives return negative signs and are significant for the specification that includes the
green.supp variable. Taken together, these estimates do not provide a clear picture regarding
the relationship between political variables and prosecutors’ decisions.
5.3 Courts
As stated in Sect. 3.3, it is plausible to assume that political influence is less significant at
the court stage. To test this, we estimate the following estimation equation:
log convictedit = α + β1 log convictedit−1 + β2 log triedit + β3CRit−1
+ β4 log agg.triedit + β5 log agg.convictedit
+ β6consit + β7greensit + β8green.vot/suppit + fi + tt + it (3)
As for prosecutors, the growth rate of environmental crime appears with lag 1. The remain-
ing variables are analogous to the previous subsections.
The first observation regarding the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 is the absence
of persistency in the volume of convictions. For the purpose of comparison, columns 3 and
4 report the estimates derived by using a traditional Fixed Effects model: Except for the
environmental awareness measures, the results remain the same. Columns 5 and 6 report
the results for system GMM to control for potential simultaneity. In contrast to the previ-
ous stages there are fewer sources of potential simultaneity: The number of tried suspects
7We verified this assumption by including both the current and the lagged variable. The current growth rate
had no significant influence in this specification.
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for both environmental and aggregate crime is determined by prosecutors’ decisions, not
by courts. The only possible, although unlikely, simultaneity exists between the amount of
convicted environmental offenders and the amount of aggregate convicted offenders as a
conviction may imply a longer lawsuit, thus binding additional resources.
A key observation regarding the results is that the input measure for the production of
convicted environmental offenders, the amount of tried suspects, has the intended effect at
a high level of significance and with an elasticity of around 1. The estimates for the growth
in environmental crimes show a negative sign, but are significant only at the 10% level for
one endogenous specification (column 5) with an elasticity of –0.15. The variables reflecting
the amount of overall tried and convicted offenders also follow the stated conjectures: The
number of tried (agg.tried) returns a negative elasticity ranging from –1.4 to –2.2 and the
number of convicted (agg.conv) a positive elasticity with values ranging from 1.4 to 2.2.
Both elasticities are highly significant throughout all specifications.
The political variables indicating whether the green and/or conservative party are part of
the state government do not seem to affect the amount of convicted environmental offenders.
The share of green voters (green.vot), on the other hand, points towards a positive influence
with an elasticity of around 0.8 to 2. The estimates for strong green support are positive
but not significant for the exogenous specifications. However, treating aggregate convicted
offenders as being endogenous leads to a positive and significant estimator with an elasticity
of 1.4.
6 Discussion
In this section we contrast previously stated conjectures with our empirical findings. The
first conjecture stressed the possible determinants of police clearing behavior regarding en-
vironmental crime.
Result 1 We find evidence for (a) the amount of reported cases of environmental crime to
increase with the amount of cleared cases. Moreover, there is evidence that (b) the growth
rate of environmental crime has the intended shift effects as parameter estimates are posi-
tive, significant and robust. There is no support for the hypothesis that the amount of tried
environmental offenders decreases the amount of cleared cases (c) through a opportunity
cost effect. The effects of aggregate crime variables (d), however, are very definitive. The
amount of aggregate crime has a significantly negative effect on the clearing of environmen-
tal offenses through an opportunity cost effect. In contrast, the aggregate amount of cleared
cases is a positive driver of the amount of cleared environmental crimes. For the politi-
cal variables there is weak evidence for the conservative dummy to negatively affect police
success in clearing environmental crimes. The remaining variables do not influence police
behavior.
Our results for the opportunity cost arguments confirm the findings of Helland (1998) in
the context of EPA enforcement of pollution control laws. Moreover, we also find evidence
for the argument that police may react to changing crime rates as proposed by Miceli (1996).
With respect to the political factors, estimates support findings in the existing literature that
politicians may have a significant impact on enforcement decisions (Mete 2002; Shipan
2004).
The behavior of prosecution is the next key institution when stepping up the enforcement
process. Their key input in the production of tried suspects is identified suspects, resulting
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from the clearing of crime cases. We summarize our empirical findings in the following
paragraph.
Result 2 There is clear-cut evidence that the amount of suspects brought to court increases
with the number of identified suspects (a). Surprisingly, the growth in environmental crime
(b) again has a highly significant and positive effect on the amount of prosecuted suspects.
We also find support for our next conjecture (c) that a higher amount of aggregate suspects
decreases the amount of tried environmental offenders through an opportunity cost effect.
There is also evidence for the scope effect: The amount of aggregate suspects tried increases
in the amount of tried environmental offenders. The estimates for the political variables do
not show a consistent pattern at the prosecution level.
In contrast to the theoretical considerations by Miceli (1996), we find evidence that pros-
ecutors are responsive to growth in environmental crimes. A higher growth in environmental
crimes leads to a significantly higher amount of tried environmental offenders. In contrast to
Rasmusen et al. (2009), we find evidence for both political and production-based factors to
influence the behavior of prosecutors, but the influence of political variables is not clear-cut.
The final institution involved in the enforcement of crimes are courts represented by
judges. Judges finally decide whether to convict a suspect and which kind of sanction to
impose.
Result 3 The input of tried offenders has the suggested effect (a) of increasing the num-
ber of convicted suspects. There is little evidence that growth in environmental crime has
a negative effect on the amount of convicted offenders (b). Similar to previous stages, how-
ever, the overall amount of tried suspects has a negative and the overall amount of convicted
criminals a positive effect on convicted environmental offender (c) and thus supporting the
opportunity cost and scope effect hypothesis. Contrary to initial expectations, we find cau-
tious support for public environmental preferences to positively influence judges’ decision to
convict offenders (d). Both the share of green supporters and the share of green voters show
positive estimates with the share of green voters being significant in all specifications and
the strong green support being significant once. The government dummies are not significant
in any specification.
Estimates for variables that are part of the production function approach are robust and
in line with the findings for police and prosecutors. Moreover, there is again evidence for
political considerations to influence judges’ decisions as the variables indicating public en-
vironmental preferences seem to have a positive influence. This is in line with a literature
that demonstrates how political factors have an influence on courts (Anderson et al. 1989;
Salzberger and Fenn 1999) or bureaucrats enforcement decisions (Headrick et al. 2002).
Our last conjecture focuses on the degree of political influence at different stages of
the enforcement process. Although our empirical findings do show evidence for political
economy factors being important determinants of agency behavior, the degree of political
influence contradicts initial predictions.
Result 4 Political economy variables seem to influence enforcement of environmental
crimes. Especially the dummy for the conservatives meant to reflect a pro-industry policy
has a negative and significant impact on police in enforcing the German Environmental Pe-
nal Code. Moreover, there seems to be evidence for our environmental awareness measures
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to positively influence the amount of convicted environmental offenders. However, as the de-
gree of control does not decrease at higher levels of the enforcement process, we do not find
support for conjecture 4.
7 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was that the criminal justice system combines at least three
distinct institutions, police, prosecution services, and courts, in order to enforce key reg-
ulations. This proliferation of agencies for a single public task—while grounded in sound
constitutional arguments—offers an opportunity for a comparative analysis of the determi-
nants of decisions at the different stages of the criminal justice system. These questions have
not been exhaustively examined from an empirical perspective.
The findings of this paper add in a significant way to existing literature. Firstly, we reaf-
firm the usefulness of the production function approach as a powerful tool for analyzing
behavior of law enforcement institutions as pioneered by Becker and Stigler (1974). On
its basis, the paper provides new evidence on the role of economic and political factors
in explaining the behavior of the criminal justice system. Secondly, it is the first paper to
our knowledge to provide this evidence not only at the level of one institution involved in
criminal enforcement, but at all three key stages of police, prosecution, and courts. This
allows us to compare the empirical record with institutional design choices. These choices
would suggest that while the police and—to a lesser extent—the prosecution service can be
expected to be responsive to public preferences, the decisions of courts should be indepen-
dent of political factors. The empirical analysis, on the other hand, finds evidence that both
economic and political factors are present at all levels. This means that—faced with scarce
resources—police, prosecutors and judges are forced to consider opportunity cost arguments
when deciding how much effort to put into enforcement and that political factors influence
this decision at the margin. It also means that political economy factors influence agency
decision making in significant ways. In line with previous results (Rasmusen et al. 2009),
there is evidence that pro-industry parties tend to decrease the enforcement of environmen-
tal crimes while public environmental preferences have a positive effect. In addition, there
is evidence that police and prosecutors respond to a growth of environmental crime with
increased effort in order to provide further deterrence, an empirical finding that contrasts
with Miceli (1996).
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Appendix A
Table 6 Estimates for different covariates
Cleared Tried Convicted
(1) (2) (3)
cleared, lag 0.682 tried, lag 0.431
(0.000) (0.000)
cases 0.198 suspects 0.599 tried 1.018
(0.072) (0.000) (0.000)
agg.cases –0.374 agg.suspects –0.193 agg.tried –1.199
(0.053) (0.696) (0.036)
agg.cleared 0.474 agg.tried 0.265 agg.convicted 1.276
(0.028) (0.379) (0.027)
CR 0.840 CR, lag 0.375 CR, lag –0.151
(0.000) (0.000) (0.228)
tried 0.0655
(0.146)
cons –0.0879 cons –0.114 cons 0.00842
(0.077) (0.140) (0.865)
greens 0.0565 greens –0.132 greens –0.0250
(0.121) (0.015) (0.624)
green.vot –0.264 green.vot –0.996 green.vot 2.018
(0.257) (0.639) (0.003)
spd –0.0507 spd –0.0616 spd –0.0237
(0.177) (0.475) (0.418)
police –0.0993
(0.313)
enforcement –0.0418 enforcement –0.192
(0.903) (0.475)
GDP –0.0182 GDP 0.284 GDP 0.754
(0.709) (0.342) (0.144)
N 137 N 121 N 135
Sargan (0.820) Sargan (0.300)
ar1 (0.004) ar1 (0.028)
ar2 (0.472) ar2 (0.386)
Note: Estimates in columns (1) and (2) and have been produced applying System GMM. For column 3, tradi-
tional FE has been applied. P -values in parenthesis. Time dummies (and a constant) have been included but
omitted here. ‘police’ and ‘enforcement’ indicate the log of real expenditures for police, and for prosecution
and courts, respectively. ‘GDP’ and ‘spd’ stand for real GDP per capita and the Social Democrats being part
of the state government in either state and year
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